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Class Outline
● Introduction – 15 minutes
● Section One – What you need to know about preparing well 
in advance of an incident – 55 minutes
● Section Two – General incident response process
● Detection and analysis – 40 minutes
● Eradication and Recovery – 10 minutes
● 30 Minute Break
● Section Three – Four use case scenarios of real incidents
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Definition of Terms
● Alert – Warning/signal about something unexpected
● Event – An event is any observable change in a system or 
network, the severity of which needs to be determined/
● Computer Security Incident – human caused event which is 
a violation or threat of the computer security policies.
● Information sources - logs, alerts, people, etc...
● Monitoring - ongoing activity of looking at information 
sources for anomalous events
● Investigation - is the activity of figuring out what has 
occurred in enough depth to understand what next steps 
need to be taken to remedy the situation
● Incident Response Team – team organized to perform the 
investigation
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General Topics for this Talk
● Preparation
● Detection & Analysis
● Containment, Recovery, & Eradication
● Case Studies
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Prevention - First Step to being Prepared
1. Understand and document project/organization 
assets and the threats and vulnerabilities to those 
assets.  Also known as a risk assessment.
2. Identify security and related policies.
3. Development of a Cyber Security Plan to protect 
against those risks.
4. Develop a Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan
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1. Performing a Risk 
Assessment
• System characterization – identify your assets. 
Everything from data, to hardware and even your 
reputation.
• Threat identification– identify negative elements that 
target your systems.
• Identify vulnerabilities – flaws or weaknesses in your 
systems.  These are constantly evolving.
• Identify and evaluate controls
• Prioritization of risks based on vulnerabilities, threats 
and likelihood of occurrence.
*See our other tutorial on developing a cybersecurity program.
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2.A Policy
• A formally documented set of rules and 
requirements that must be met. 
• Lays out what is important to the 
organization or project by identifying key 
assets and the need to protect or manage 
those assets.  
• You may have project policy, 
organization/departmental policies, 
institutional policy and government regulated 
policies.
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2.B Policy Examples
• Information classification policy - Classifies types of data and 
what risk exposure is to them.
• HIPAA, FERPA, ITAR, EAR – Federal government regulations
• Information disclosure policy - How and to whom project 
information might be shared.
• Media policy - Who and how will interaction with the media 
be conducted.
• Privacy policy - Address the privacy expectations of 
participants in the project.
• Security policy - How will security be treated by the project.
• Disaster recovery - How will the project recover from any 
type of disaster.
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3. Cybersecurity Plan
● A plan/strategy to address the risks your 
project/organization have identified.
● Cybersecurity best practice – as a starting point
➢ http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls
➢ For more details see our tutorial on developing a 
cybersecurity plan.
● Monitoring and alert systems
➢ These feed your incident investigations
➢ In open environments monitoring is a key security 
backbone.
● Networks & firewalls
● Hosts & application logging
● Intrusion detection systems
● Scans
● Security threat lists and feeds
● Much more on this later in the talk
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 Incident Response Planning
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4. Incident Response Plan
• Guide – NIST SP800-61
• Identifies
➢ Process used to investigate an incident
➢ Incident mitigation to remedy the situation, 
including potentially patching, blocking off, 
and recovery
➢ Documents what was found, how, when, and 
what was done to remedy it
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Incident Response Plan Categories
1. Incident Alert Mechanisms
2. Forming a team – makeup and skills
3. Contact information & Incident reporting 
mechanisms – who, what, when, how……
4. Team coordination & communication
5. Secure information channels
6. Monitoring - Information sources & tools
7. Log Management
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1. General Incident Response 
Preparation
• Establish and document ways for stakeholders to 
contact the security team.
➢Members of the organization
➢Members of other organizations
➢Establish accessible and searchable on-line site for this 
and other information related to contacting incident 
response and security contact directory
• Establish ways to track an incident “ticket”
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2.A Forming an IR Team
• Decide who is on the team
➢ Someone to lead investigation (may depend upon experience)
➢ Network expertise
➢ Key application expertise
➢ Security knowledge and responsibility
• Define roles and responsibilities
➢ Who is leading
➢ Analysts
➢ Containment
➢ Restore
➢ Define expectations of outside resources
• Identify subject matter experts
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2.B Types of IR Teams
● Managed Security Team
➢ This team has experience with security and incident 
response.
➢ Likely more than a single individual
● One (maybe full-time) security person.
➢ Several other members who know they will be called 
on during an incident
● A person who is assigned as part of other duties
● Distributed Team
➢ May be a coordinated response by multiple teams
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2.C IR Team Skills
Team Leader
✓ Communication skills
✓ Diplomacy
✓ Organized
✓ Integrity
✓ Coping with Stress
✓ Problem Solving
✓ Time Management
Team Members
✓ Networking Expertise
✓ Knowledge of Key 
Applications and Services
✓ Host & System Expertise
✓ Malicious Code (Viruses, 
Worms, Trojan Horse 
programs)
✓ Programming Skills
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3. Who to contact and When
Campus
● Incident Response team
● Organizational Leads
System Owners and Developers
● Resource Owner
● Network and System admins
● Apps and Services experts
Project Leads
● PI
● Managers
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Stakeholders
● On Campus
● Other Sites
● Users
Law Enforcement
● Campus Legal
● Police, etc...
Media
● Talk to campus first
It is also important to know HOW you will communicate to each of these
4.A Internal IR Team Coordination & 
Communications
● Identify the leader of the incident
➢ Define responsibilities and roles
➢ Assign the roles
● Identify who is authorized to make decisions
➢ Does the system have to come down?
➢ Whole system need to be scrubbed and reinstalled?
➢ Initiate immediate plan of action? (black-hole routing)
● Define communication and collaboration plan
➢ Remote access
➢ Outside organizations
➢ Collaboration environments
● Name who will interact with external groups
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4.B External IR Coordination
• Develop 
Relationships
➢ Other departments
➢ University IT/Security 
team
➢ ISP
➢ Related projects
➢ Vendors
➢ Legal advisors
➢ Law enforcement – you 
may need approval from legal 
first
• Information Sharing 
Agreements
➢ How much
➢ How to share
➢ Security, privacy, and 
legal considerations
• Reporting 
Requirements
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4.C Dry Run/Practicing
● Test all your IR plans and procedures
➢ Run through all the scenarios you’re 
prepared for if possible
➢ Involve as many of the team members as 
possible
➢ Test communication channels (wikis, 
encryption keys, communication lines)
➢ Be sure to test disaster recovery procedures
● Test at least once per year
● Better to find issues during a test than a real 
incident
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5. Secure Communications
• Direct Communications
➢ Person to person calls
➢ PGP with an Email client is a great communication tool - If you have 
a distributed team then hold signing sessions at events
➢ Jabber for IM style messaging - http://www.jabber.org/
➢Other IM tools may work well such as OTR (https://otr.
cypherpunks.ca/) combined with Adium
➢ Secure phone conferencing – authenticated
➢Pay special attention to #passcode distribution methods
➢Voice authenticate each participant
• On-line Collaboration
➢ Secure Wiki - Store evidence and other incident data for 
collaborative investigations
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5.A Monitoring Services
• Security systems
➢ Intrusion Detection System logs
➢ Host-based syslogs
➢ Firewall logs
➢ Vulnerability scan reports – a service that is run
➢ Log analysis services
➢ DHCP – bind IP assignment to devices and owners
• Network and switch devices & services
➢ Netflow – capture of network level flows typically just headers
➢ DNS – device connections
• Storage infrastructure – usage information
• Operating systems and Applications
➢ Syslog
➢ Key-stroke 
➢ Performance and reliability logs
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5.B Of Special Interest
• Authentication logs – These are key focus points in 
understanding the attack vector of many of the common 
incidents (this can be found in syslogs). 
• You should monitor:
➢ Login attempts – successes and failures
• From where (ip address)
• When (btw make sure you’re utilizing NTP for time 
synchronization)
• Authentication method and versions
➢ Privilege escalation attempts – successes and failures
➢ Logout times
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 6. Log Management Policies and 
Procedures
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Log Management Policies and 
Procedures
• Logs are the source of all your investigative efforts.
• It is important to establish site wide log 
management procedures.
• For large projects and sites this typically requires a 
dedicated log management infrastructure.
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Log Capture
• Ensure logging is enabled on security systems, routers and 
devices, storage, VMs, operating systems and applications
• Ensure that data captured includes all key events such as:
• Sign in and out plus identity, Source and destination, AuthN 
Versions, Synchronized Time stamp, root activity
• If it applies record sensitive data access
• Consider privacy issues when setting up user activity logging
• Remember this information captures user behavior
• Universities have strict rules about privacy
• Monitor any changes or access to the logging infrastructure
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Log Retention and Storage
• A centrally managed log management infrastructure is needed
• Automated methods to move logs or shadow them
• For efficiency as well as security
• Log management system restricted to security staff.
• Your going to be adding to logs constantly so devise a 
strategy to meet those requirements and take into 
consideration how you use the logs (i.e. search them) 
• Data retention policy
• Ensure retired logs are disposed of
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Log Protection
• Secure the processes that generates log entries
• Limit access to log files – trusted staff only
• Implement secure log transfer mechanisms 
• Protect the confidentiality and integrity of log files
• Provide adequate physical protection for logging 
mechanisms and stored logs
• Validate log system is working daily
• Logs are valuable because they contain so much 
information, information other’s may also find 
useful
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Log Analysis
• Regularly review and analyze logs 
• Automation is KEY
• Leverage correlation tools for holistic view & reduce false 
positives
• Use automated reporting generation tools and review daily
• Log analysis should include real-time monitoring 
• NCSA has a “quicker” real-time analysis and,
• A daily deeper dive log analysis
• Set up an alerting system based on priorities
• Develop a baseline of typical log entries in order to detect unusual 
or anomalous events or activities
• And keep updating this over time.
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Log Analysis Tools/Services
ELSA (https://code.google.com/p/enterprise-log-search-and-archive/)
ELSA provides a query interface that normalizes logs and makes searching for arbitrary 
strings easy.
OSSEC (http://www.ossec.net/)
OSSEC performs log analysis, file integrity checking, policy monitoring, rootkit 
detection, real-time alerting and active response.
SEC - simple event correlator (http://simple-evcorr.sourceforge.net/)
SEC is an event correlation tool for event processing which can be harnessed for event log 
monitoring, for network and security management.
Splunk (http://www.splunk.com/)
Collects data from remote sources and helps to correlate complex events.  Splunk will 
allow you to index data and make it searchable.
Bro (http://bro.org/)
Provides logging activities and traffic analysis and a very extensible way to analyze network 
data in real time
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Attack Motivations
• Economic – monetary gains or business advantage
➢ State sponsored spying – stealing secrets of all kinds
➢ Business competition
➢ Personal gain - including Bitcoin mining and related
• Public Relations & hactivism
➢ Same three as above
• Personal Vendetta
➢ Disgruntled worker or user 
• Experimentation
➢ Just for fun 
➢ Training
• To launch attacks on other systems/sites
• Terrorists
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Understanding Basic Attack Vectors
• Stolen accounts & brute force – basically password attacks 
➢ Attacker reused the username and PW captured from 
another site – likely a system that is more vulnerable
• Insider attacks – believe it or not students and even 
professors are an attack vector.  Unfortunately these can be 
very difficult to detect or protect against
• Software vulnerabilities - 
➢ Misconfiguration of systems
➢ Poor patch management – unaddressed known 
vulnerabilities – these are what intruders scan for and 
then utilize root kits to attack for privilege access. 
➢ Zero day attacks
• Malicious Code (Viruses, Worms, Trojan Horses, etc…)
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Alerts to an Incident
“Gee, that does not look right!”
• System admins keeping 
an eye on the system
• Poor system Performance
➢Process monitoring
➢Memory usage
➢Disk or networking activity
• Unusual 
➢ In/Out connections
➢ Traffic patterns
• Storage has filled up
• Unusual user behavior
➢Active at unusual times
➢Unusual increase in their 
usage
• Users see suspicious 
activities with their own 
accounts
➢ Odd files or directories
➢ Usage increases
➢ History file changes
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Other Common Incident Alerts
• Direct alerts from your monitoring services
• Automated analysis of logs and correlations
• Alerts from trusted sources of malicious activities or 
newly exposed vulnerabilities
➢ Partner alerts you on suspicious activities
➢ Alerts from vulnerability scans
➢ Vulnerability alerts from a vendor or trusted agent
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Basic Incident Response Cycle
1. Determining if there is an incident
2. Communicate the incident
3. Determine how to handle the incident
4. Perform a detailed investigation 
5. Contain the incident
6. Recovery
7. Eradicate
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Step 1: Determine if there is an Incident
● Head of security or incident response team has been alerted 
to some kind of unusual behavior by an individual or service. 
*remember the monitoring services you put into place in the preparation section
● Perhaps notified by some outside source that interesting 
things are happening.
➢ Might be a new vulnerability announced
➢ A detected incident at a different site that points to your site
➢ Maybe you just feel something does not look right
● Now your security or IR lead is responsible to determine if 
there is an incident
● Begin to gather information from the alert source
● Then perform an initial investigation
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Step 2: Communicate the Incident
● Summarize what you know and using your communication 
plan begin to inform the contacts via the reporting 
procedures you established as part of your incident response 
plan.
● Make sure everyone knows you’re on top of the incident
● Identify who is authorized to make decisions
● Identify who will interact with external groups
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Step 3: Determining How to Handle the 
Incident
● Review alert details to understand what it is telling you
● Look for other alerts that may be related
● Review pertinent logs and services to validate the alert
➢ This is why you est. log management procedures
➢ This is when you start to utilize your log analysis tools
● Characterize the impact of the incident
➢ Has it or is it capable to causing harm to your assets?
➢ How much impact might it have?
➢ Is this a recently detected “older” event or something new and 
rapidly expanding?
➢ Identify roughly when this incident started (if possible)
➢ Who needs to know about and what decisions need to me made?
➢ Who might I need to assist with the investigation?
➢ Determine the attack vector.
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3.A Decide how to proceed with incident 
response
• Understand what tools and data sources are available to you 
for further understanding the scope of the incident 
➢ system logs
➢ application logs
➢ firewall logs
➢ IDS alerts
➢ File system information
• Are there any mitigation strategies we need to deploy?
➢ Increase the monitoring of the affected environment to assess 
whether it’s being actively used by an attacker
➢ Firewalling or black hole routing
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3.B Additional Questions to Consider
● Decide what the response goal is for this incident
➢ End the attack and get back on-line quickly
➢ investigate with the idea of prosecution
➢ or?
● Do you already have response procedures? 
➢ If so, are they valid for this incident?
● If the incident is still going on will we perform live analysis?
➢ What tools can monitor the environment
● Check your backup and restore capabilities
➢ Have they been followed?
➢ Are the backups valid?
● Make assignments on who will do what next
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3.C Privacy Breaches
• Special note here - be aware if this incident:
➢ Involves any Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) or Personal Health 
Information (PHI)?
➢ Violates International Traffic and Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) compliance?
➢ Or other privacy policy infraction
Aug 17, 2015
Incident Response
 
Step 4: Organize Incident Response Team
● Pull team together and layout the incident details
● Assign duties and review procedures
● Team communications & sharing services
➢ Secure Email
➢ Secure Wiki
● Schedule team physical collaboration spaces such as a war 
room
Aug 17, 2015
Incident Response
Step 4.A: Perform a Detailed Investigation
● Gather up the needed information
● Some of this will be pulling logs together
● Some of it will be analysis of systems and services for 
additional information
➢ Has anything been left behind – 
• Applications and tools
• Data files
➢ Have files been modified?
➢ Have access permissions been modified?
➢ Did the intruder gain root
● Move forward and backwards through the logs as well as diagonally 
through other logs, systems and organizations.
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Step 4.B: Investigation Checklist
 Action Complete
1.0 Find out if any security alerts were generated  
1.1 Identify any observations that lead up to incident  
1.2 Understand how the problem was initially detected  
2.0 Understand the nature of the problem  
3.0 Gain specific knowledge  
3.1 How was the problem initially detected  
4.0 Identify what has been affected  
4.1 Equipment  
4.2 Devices  
4.3 Groups  
5.0 Identify affected applications  
5.1 Identify affected data  
6.0 What has been done so far  
6.1 Processes, services stopped/restarted  
6.2 Files modified  
6.3 Files deleted  
6.4 Tools run  
7.0 Identify containment steps that may have been taken  
8.0 Review logs  
9.0 Find the ingress and egress paths  
10.0 Investigate if there are any risk to other organizations  
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*adapted from SANS Incident Response Handbook
Step 4.C: Secure Evidence 
● It may be vital to secure evidence for later 
disciplinary actions
➢ We have had requests from our university legal for 
incidents that are over 3 years old
➢ Most times we know in advance these are likely to be 
on-going needs for the evidence
● Preserve evidence in a secure way
● Maintain a chain of custody
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Step 5: Containment: Limit the damage 
and prevent any further damage
1. Understand what the problem is and decide how to 
proceed
➢ Let it run – this allows you to gather more information
➢ Isolate the service or host that has been compromised
➢ Bring everything down
2. How do you make the decision?
➢ Do you have to contact people?
➢ What does your procedure say to do?
➢ Contact list
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Step 5.A: Containment Options
1. Short-term Containment
➢ Can the problem be isolated? Taken offline?
➢ Are all affected systems isolated from non-affected systems?
2. System Backup
➢ Gather information from affected systems for further analysis
➢ Have all commands and other documentation since the incident occurred 
been kept up to date?
3. Long-term containment
➢ If the system can be taken offline, then proceed to the Eradication phase.
➢ If the system must remain in production, proceed with long-term 
containment by removing all malware and other artifacts from affected 
systems.  Harden the affected systems from further attacks until an ideal 
circumstance will allow the affected systems to be reimaged.
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Step 6: Recovery
• Bring any affected systems, services, and applications back into production
• Restore data and configurations
➢ Identify the proper time and date of the recovery media
➢ Verify images restored correctly and completely
• Ensure the entire incident is cleaned up
• Test all systems, services and applications if possible
• Continue to monitor for any signs of an on-going issue
➢ Any more strange behavior
➢ Access attempts from the same attack IP(s) or account(s)
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Step 7: Is the Incident Really Eradicated?
● How do you know the problem is really gone?
● You need to really understand what happened.
➢ Attack vector(s)
➢ Backdoors
➢ Changes made
● All files that have been changed need to be identified
● Close all the doors that might have been used
● Exhaustive search for any tools that might have been 
installed
● Add additional monitoring if none is available
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Document Lessons Learned
● Document the details so you have a complete record of everything that 
happened
● When was the problem was first detected and by whom?
● The scope and impact of the incident?
● What actions were taken to identify and address?
● How did you ensure it was all cleaned up?
● What actions were taken in the recovery process?
● Was the incident response plan effective? And if not what needs to be 
addressed
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Reassessing Preparation and Response
Conduct a post mortem
● Delve into the who, what, how, when, and why of the incident
● Review how things could have gone better in order to improve your 
processes
● Keep the meeting calm - limit the finger pointing
● Keep the meeting focused - get the information to fix the problem and 
improve things
● Identify if the incident could have been identified sooner or even 
prevented
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The Final Analysis
At the heart of all these issues is one important 
question: 
Why did this happen and can we prevent it from 
happening again?
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A reminder about communication…
● Don’t underestimate the importance of 
communication
● If you don’t tell the necessary people that you 
are taking action they will assume you’re not 
doing anything (I have been bitten by this one numerous time)
● Communication suggestions
● When you have determined there has been a 
compromise
● When you have concluded the investigation and and 
planning the eradication and recovery
● When the the service or system is back in production
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General Topics for this Talk
● Preparation
● Detection & Analysis
● Containment, Recovery & Eradication
● Case Studies – but first a 30 minute break
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Part 3
Case Studies
• HPC Bitcoin – Insider attack
• HPC Pivot Attack – Shared credential incident
• Heartbleed – Zero day 
• Crimea – PR attack
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HPC Bitcoin
Alert and Determining if it is an Incident
• Alert – An HPC admin identified 
an issue with the job scheduler 
and questioned whether the jobs 
were MPMD (multiple program 
multiple data) jobs.
• The admin used a script to review 
user jobs and confirm whether 
these were MPMD jobs, which 
they were not.
• Upon reviewing the job, he saw 
the word “bitcoin”:
aprun -n 1024 -N 1 -d 16 -j 1
./alpha-test.x
-url=http://213.133.127.145:8332
-user=bitcoin_user@yahoo.com_cpu
-password=foo -threads=16
-workrefreshms=2000
• The PoC for the grant allocation 
was contacted and suggested to 
escalate the investigation. 
• The Admin further researched 
jobs showing apparent bitcoin 
activity and found 75,000 node-
hours had been used.
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HPC Bitcoin
Initial Investigation
• Incident response team directed Admins to look into 
directory where they found odd files
• Executables in the user’s directory contained “strings” that 
verified they were bitcoin-related
• IRT staff looked at keystroke and Bro logs
• Reviewed Bro conn logs to identify the ports used.  
➢ The ports correlated with known bitcoin ports
• Found out the user was a team member on the project 
After consulting with key stakeholders we decided monitoring 
was the appropriate method of containment
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HPC Bitcoin
Communicating the Incident
• Notified the PI of the resource – note this is an NSF-funded 
computer which is allocated for national research
• PI notified and consulted with NSF PO
• Notified organizational leaders
• Organizational leaders contacted campus leaders for a 
briefing and advice
• University legal were briefed on the incident
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HPC Bitcoin
Investigating the Incident
● Early questions:
➢ Was it just one account 
and one user? 
• Was this a wider 
intrusion? 
➢ Someone using his 
account? 
• Stolen?
• Shared?
● Information Sources Used
➢ SSH logs – what 
commands were run
➢ Bro logs – downloaded 
files
➢ History files – user 
activities
➢ Admins looked for similar 
jobs
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HPC Bitcoin
Investigating the Incident
Note from Admin:
Sunday I alerted that the user had actively running jobs. I checked a script and 
identified they were running the same script/program I investigated Friday. Notified 
Resource PI and organizational leaders that the bitcoin miner user was back. Resource PI 
asked to again verify that it was indeed bitcoin related and not just named the same, 
and I found:
strings test-alpha-gpu.x |grep -i bitcoin
bitcoinminercuda_20.cubin
bitcoinminercuda_11.cubin
bitcoinminercuda_10.cubin
/u/sciteam/alpha-test-rpc-gpu/src/cuda/bitcoinminercuda.cu
/u/sciteam/alpha-test-rpc-gpu/src/cuda/bitcoinminercuda.cu
I also found source code for the rpcminer bitcoin miner, and some diablo miner remnants 
(another miner program) in his homedir.
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HPC Bitcoin
Contain, Eradicate, & Recover
● Contain
● Locked down user accounts
● Closed the holes in the system 
● Added rules to Bro to better detect bitcoin mining
● Eradicate
● Admins removed bitcoin software
● Recover
● Got copies of all logs, files, and software.  (Once you 
remove and recover the information is gone for good)
● Make sure you have everything in case you need it 
later 
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HPC Pivot Attack/
Shared Credential Incident
➢IRT saw an announcement that a partner site had an incident
•Not long after the campus cluster was having problems
•Security noticed that the incident was similar to the 
partner site’s incident.
•Sysadmins received calls from users reporting problems 
accessing head nodes
•Investigation showed the head nodes were up but there were 
“oddities” in syslog
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HPC Pivot Attack
Alert
Users unable to login & Syslog indications:
Oct 18 07:26:09 head1 sshd[21111]: rexec line 80: Unsupported option GSSAPIAuthentication
Oct 18 07:26:09 head1 sshd[21111]: rexec line 82: Unsupported option GSSAPICleanupCredentials
Oct 18 07:26:09 head1 sshd[21111]: rexec line 96: Unsupported option UsePAM
Oct 18 07:26:11 head1 sshd[21111]: reprocess config line 80: Unsupported option 
GSSAPIAuthentication
Oct 18 07:26:21 head1 sshd[22810]: rexec line 80: Unsupported option GSSAPIAuthentication
Oct 18 07:26:21 head1 sshd[22810]: rexec line 82: Unsupported option GSSAPICleanupCredentials
Oct 18 07:26:21 head1 sshd[22810]: rexec line 96: Unsupported option UsePAM
Oct 18 10:52:21 head1 sshd[11039]: User user1 not allowed because account is locked
Oct 18 10:57:13 head1 sshd[11753]: User user2 not allowed because account is locked
Oct 18 10:58:36 head1 sshd[11948]: User user3 not allowed because account is locked
Oct 18 10:59:04 head1 sshd[12010]: User user3 not allowed because account is locked
Oct 18 11:02:50 head1 sshd[12866]: User user4 not allowed because account is locked
Oct 18 11:03:08 head1 sshd[12906]: User user4 not allowed because account is locked
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HPC Pivot Attack
Communication with Incident Response Team
● Admins contacted IRT and were informed that one node was 
rebooted for troubleshooting. The other affected node was 
left in compromised state but blocked from access.
● Rebooting reimaged the node so it destroyed all information 
for investigation.
● IRT assisted with investigation and identified a modified 
SSHD binary
● Also learned of a concurrent incident going on at partner site
● Found the same user account on both clusters. Passwords 
were likely similar.
● Both sites had toolkit to gain root access. 
Aug 17, 2015
Incident Response
HPC Pivot Attack
Next Steps/Mitigation
● Reviewing the options, what next? 
➢ Admins locked down the system
• restricted access to local network only
• locked the 2nd bastian host for analysis
• and locked the compromised account
➢ Began an investigation
➢ Critical to stop this as quickly as possible to 
prevent further compromise.
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HPC Pivot Attack: Bro Logs
Initial Investigation
http_outbound
2013-10-18 10:41:52.32975 BA4npmhPLmd 72.36.84.11 41249 173.10.160.233 80 1 GET     
grsecurity.net /~spender/exploits/enlightenment.tgz - Wget/1.12 (linux-gnu) 0 106904 200 
OK - - - (empty) - - - application/x-gzip - -
2013-10-18 11:45:43.069156 lbziRB71lJ2 72.36.84.12 45495 83.228.93.76 80 1 GET 
exploitworld.pc-freak.net /tools/logcleaners/mig-logcleaner.tar.gz - Wget/1.12 (linux-
gnu) 0 6705 200 OK - - - (empty) - - -
ftp
2013-10-18 11:47:20.356827 CUeejNxNjwf 72.36.84.12 39884 66.218.72.127 21 sh0692 
<hidden> RETR ftp://66.218.72.127/sshbackdoor.tar.gz - - 0 226 Transfer complete. - -
2013-10-21 05:50:34.980513 WHYA9rBaBr 72.36.84.11 52859 66.218.72.127 21 sh0692 <hidden> 
STOR ftp://66.218.72.127/./known_hosts - - - 226 Transfer complete. - -
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Initial Investigation
[root@mgmt1 ~]# ssh head1 md5sum /usr/sbin/sshd
59cc0ee569f6c63db168b3a995a78585  /usr/sbin/sshd
[root@mgmt1 ~]# ssh compute101 md5sum /usr/sbin/sshd
59cc0ee569f6c63db168b3a995a78585  /usr/sbin/sshd
[root@mgmt1 ~]# ssh compute100 md5sum /usr/sbin/sshd
59cc0ee569f6c63db168b3a995a78585  /usr/sbin/sshd
[root@mgmt1 ~]# ssh head2 md5sum /usr/sbin/sshd
828008572453357cbac5a84d50a67260  /usr/sbin/sshd
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Initial Investigation
#rpm --verify -v openssh-server openssh clients
[root@head1 ~]
......... c /etc/pam.d/ssh-keycat
S.5....T. c /etc/pam.d/sshd
.........   /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
S.5....T. c /etc/ssh/sshd_config
......... c /etc/sysconfig/sshd
.........   /usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server
.........   /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keycat
.........   /usr/sbin/.sshd.hmac
.........   /usr/sbin/sshd
.........   /var/empty/sshd
S.5....T. c /etc/ssh/ssh_config
.........   /usr/bin/.ssh.hmac
.........   /usr/bin/scp
.........   /usr/bin/sftp
....L....   /usr/bin/slogin
.........   /usr/bin/ssh
.........   /usr/bin/ssh-add
.........   /usr/bin/ssh-agent
.........   /usr/bin/ssh-copy-id
.........   /usr/bin/ssh-keyscan
[root@head2 ~]
......... c /etc/pam.d/ssh-keycat
S.5....T. c /etc/pam.d/sshd
.........   /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
S.5....T. c /etc/ssh/sshd_config
......... c /etc/sysconfig/sshd
.........   /usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server
.........   /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keycat
.........   /usr/sbin/.sshd.hmac
S.5....T.   /usr/sbin/sshd
.........   /var/empty/sshd
S.5....T. c /etc/ssh/ssh_config
.........   /usr/bin/.ssh.hmac
S.5....T.   /usr/bin/scp
S.5....T.   /usr/bin/sftp
.........   /usr/bin/slogin
S.5....T.   /usr/bin/ssh
S.5....T.   /usr/bin/ssh-add
SM5...GT.   /usr/bin/ssh-agent
.........   /usr/bin/ssh-copy-id
S.5....T.   /usr/bin/ssh-keyscan
S – Size
M – Mode
5 – MD5
T - mtime timestamp
G – File groupAug 17, 2015
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Further Analysis
[irt@investigation .ssh]$ cat known_hosts
hpc-alpha.acme.edu,11.12.13.14 ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAy...
hpc-beta.acme.edu,15.16.17.18 ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEA4...
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Communicating the Incident
● Contacted other orgs about incident and suggested 
they check their systems
● Found more overlapping accounts and let other 
sites know
● Looked for what files had been replaced
● Checked local systems for similar files
● Checked network traffic for similar downloads
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Contain, Eradicate, & Recover
• Contain: Locked down access to local IPs only until 
affected accounts locked
• Gathered all data
• Eradicate: system was behind on patches.  Known 
security hole was exploited
• Recover: Rebooted with patched system
• All users were instructed to change passwords 
before access restored
• Education of users
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Zero-Day Response
● Vulnerability reported in OpenSSL library in April, 2014
➢ IR team had to determine if there were any affected systems
• Good configuration management system is extremely valuable 
in these types of situations 
➢ Scanned all systems looking for issues
➢ Allowed access of memory block 
➢ Determining the impact of the vulnerability
• How many systems were affected? 
• Did all users need to change passwords?
● A note about Bro intrusion detection…
➢ IR team used Bro to generate a list of affected machines
➢ Reduced list from thousands of possibly affected machines to a 
couple hundred
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Example of Vulnerability
  0210: 6B 69 65 3A 20 50 48 50 53 45 53 53 49 44 3D 38  kie: PHPSESSID=8
  0220: 32 62 33 32 61 33 66 64 61 33 61 30 34 33 37 62  2b32a3fda3a0437b
  0230: 31 64 39 37 37 34 32 31 37 32 30 66 31 36 35 3B  1d977421720f165;
  0240: 20 63 6F 6F 6B 69 65 5F 74 65 73 74 3D 31 33 39   cookie_test=139
  0250: 37 31 34 35 30 35 37 0D 0A 0D 0A 5F 5F 63 73 72  7145057....__csr
  0260: 66 5F 6D 61 67 69 63 3D 73 69 64 25 33 41 33 32  f_magic=sid%3A32
  0270: 37 34 33 66 33 38 39 65 66 62 35 38 63 33 65 36  743f389efb58c3e6
  0280: 34 63 36 62 65 62 62 38 63 65 62 39 36 35 33 32  4c6bebb8ceb96532
  0290: 33 39 37 66 36 36 25 32 43 31 33 39 37 31 34 31  397f66%2C1397141
  02a0: 34 35 37 26 75 73 65 72 6E 61 6D 65 66 6C 64 3D  457&usernamefld=
  02b0: 61 64 6D 69 6E 26 70 61 73 73 77 6F 72 64 66 6C  admin&passwordfl
  02c0: 64 3D 78 36 38 61 70 68 75 66 61 70 68 61 26 6C  d=x68aphufapha&l
  02d0: 6F 67 69 6E 3D 4C 6F 67 69 6E 30 75 83 31 CE 8E  ogin=Login0u.1..
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Communicating the Incident
● Notified admins of problem machines to fix 
immediately
● Blocked problem machines until fixed
● Sent an email to all staff explaining what Heartbleed 
was and gave instructions on what to do next 
(change passwords) 
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Monitoring/Alerting
● Created automated scan to find vulnerable hosts
➢ Leveraged Bro “Services” log
➢ Leveraged Proof of Concept Script
➢ Leveraged Splunk
● Network Monitoring
➢ Implemented NSM solution for detecting 
attempts
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Recovery
● Fix took a patch and reboot.
● Systems were not allowed back until script verified 
they were properly fixed
● Many systems took a long time to patch (e.g. ESX)
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Overview
• A pro-Russian Crimean Referendum site was hit with 
a denial of service attack (DDoS) in March, 2014
• NCSA’s PR team was contacted by American media 
outlets to comment on the DDoS attack, because...
• Voice of Russia media outlet reported the University 
of Illinois campus network as the origin of the attack
• The cybersecurity team was able to confirm the 
University did not contribute to the attack
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Threat Identification & Mitigation
• Weeks before the Crimean website incident occurred… 
• IRT identified a potential threat against the University’s 
network
• Found that a network time protocol (NTP) reflection 
attack was possible
• IRT scanned network for hosts running NTP
• Notified administrators of machines that required 
mitigation
• In the meantime IRT blocked hosts running NTP until they 
were patched
• After patching IRT rescanned hosts to confirm they were 
adequately patched
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Communication/Initial Investigation
• NCSA PR was contacted by a reporter asking about 
claims of NCSA’s involvement in Crimean referendum 
DDoS attack.
• PR relayed the information to IRT
• IRT began an analysis
➢Checked flow logs – Nothing found
➢Checked http logs – Nothing found
➢Ran another NTP scan – Nothing found
Aug 17, 2015
Incident Response
Crimea
The Voice of Russia
Quoted from Voice of Russia, “US hackers target Crimean referendum website,” March 16, 2014:
 
“Our IT safety experts managed to find out where those attacks came from. It is University 
of Illinois at Urbana Champaign. The most powerful scanning of servers before the attack 
was carried out exactly from there.”
It is significant that Urbana – Champaign, with a population of 37,000, has the highest 
number of subnets with IP addresses. Let’s take for example subnet 192.17.0.0 – 192.17. 
255.255 whose range makes it possible to offer approximately 500 IP to each citizen, and 
there are at least five such subnets in the city.
In other words, the technological and technical potentialities of this city exceed by 
thousands of times the needs of its residents. 
Besides, there are three airports in Urbana. There is no official information about the 
location of military bases on its territory, but there signs that one of the headquarters of the 
National Security Agency is situated there.
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Communication
• NCSA contacted the University’s central IT security 
team at CITES to relay their internal report
• Sent notification to organization directors, campus 
legal team, and CISO
• And contacted PR to confirm details that we did not, 
in any way, contribute
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Review
• Determine if an incident occurred
➢ Admin noticed “bitcoin” in some job requests, contact IRT
➢ IRT reviewed home directory listings, port usage, etc., determined this was intentional 
• Determine course of action 
➢ Blocked user account and developed a plan for improving network monitoring
• Communicate the incident (throughout the IR process)
➢ IRT notified grant manager, University legal staff, and management notified the NSF
• Perform an investigation 
➢ Collected evidence: HPC logs, user directory logs, questioned account owner
• Contain the incident
➢ Implemented plan to add additional notices to Bro monitoring software
• Eradicate 
➢ Admins removed bitcoin software from HPC 
• Recovery 
➢ No data/information loss from this incident
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Lesson Learned
• Be on the lookout for new attack methods
• Bitcoin mining may not seem like an attack, but it 
was a violation of the Authorized Use Policy for the 
resource
• We were not too concerned about insider attacks 
previous to this event. We have learned from that 
mistake. 
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Review
• Determine if an incident occurred
➢ Campus cluster received report of users being locked out of head nodes
➢ Noticed oddity in syslogs 
• Determine course of action 
➢ Locked down access until IRT could identify what happened
• Communicate the incident (throughout the IR process)
➢ Coordinate with sysadmins, communicate problem to other affiliated organizations 
• Perform an investigation 
➢ Checked files for compromises, gathered logs, found root toolkit had been installed
• Contain the incident
➢ Blocked accounts; also resetting passwords or adding two-factor authentication can help
• Eradicate 
➢ Restarted nodes to clean, patched image 
• Recovery 
➢ Patching procedure changed, added more user education about password security 
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Lesson Learned
• IR team worked quickly to block accounts until they 
could determine what had happened 
• Communication to affiliated organizations helped 
contain the attack
• Logs were crucial to determining what had happened
• Following through the incident life cycle
• User passwords were reset, more training, and 
scanning systems after patches were applied
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Review
• Determine if an incident occurred
➢ IRT was proactive, they knew about the vulnerability prior to media publication 
➢ Staying up-to-date on latest threats reduces reaction time 
• Determine course of action 
➢ Develop plan to locate affected machines
➢ Block hosts that are not patched within deadline
• Communicate the incident (throughout the IR process)
➢ Coordinate with sysadmins, notify users to change passwords
• Perform an investigation 
➢ Since the vulnerability was known the method of attack was also known
• Contain the incident
➢ Patch hosts and block unpatched hosts
• Eradicate 
➢ Bro helped identify which machines were affected to cut down on patching time
• Recovery 
➢ Stopped blocking hosts after patches were confirmed; campus users had to change PWs
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Lesson Learned
• A proactive IR team reduces inefficiency (time) when 
a security vulnerability is discovered
• Clearly communicate plans to shut down services so 
users aren’t left in the dark 
• Use tools like Bro to reduce time assessing the 
damage 
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Review
• Determine if an incident occurred
➢ Russian news outlet cited the U of I as the source of a DDoS attack on a Crimean website
➢ An incident clearly occurred, but was NCSA involved? 
• Determine course of action 
➢ NCSA IR team was contacted to look into the accusation
• Communicate the incident (throughout the IR process)
➢ Communication to the press was limited to PR departments
➢ But, communication between NCSA and University management was frequent
• Perform an investigation 
➢ The investigation found that an NTP vulnerability was patched weeks before the incident
• Contain the incident
➢ No containment needed
• Eradicate 
➢ No eradication needed
• Recovery 
➢ No recovery needed
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Lesson Learned
• Some “incidents” are more of a PR management 
problem than an event worthy of incident response
• These events are an opportunity for the IR team to 
share their expertise with the spokespeople 
responsible for addressing the media
• Keep communication lines open 
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